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Internal  labor  markets have been  explained  with  efficiency  and 
control arguments; however, retrospective event-history data from 
279 organizations suggest that federal Equal Employment Opportu- 
nity (EEO)  law was the force behind the spread of formal promotion 
mechanisms after  1964. The findings highlight the way in which 
American public policy, with its broad outcome-oriented guidelines 
for organizations, stimulates managers to experiment with compli- 
ance mechanisms with an eye to judicial  sanction. In response to 
EEO legislation  and case  law, personnel  managers devised  and 
diffused employment practices that treat all classes of  workers as 
ambitious and achievement oriented in the process of  formalizing 
and rationalizing promotion decisions. 
INTRODUCTION 
Do the policies  of  America's notoriously "weak"  federal state have any 
effect  on  organizational  practices  at all? Until  recently  organizational 
theorists seemed to agree that they only affected management behavior at 
the margins. Lately, that belief has come under scrutiny. Organizational 
analysts have come to the conclusion that common management practices 
do not arise through spontaneous combustion in thousands of  different 
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locations  at once; rather they are socially constructed  by  networks of 
managers who are attentive to signals and incentives that emanate from 
the state, the legal system, and the wider political culture. Many practices 
we think of  as motivated by  strict efficiency concerns, such as merger 
and acquisition strategies, can be traced to an iterative process in which 
the state creates broad rules about corporate behavior and then organiza- 
tions experiment to find practical strategies that will be acceptable to the 
courts (Fligstein 1990; Edelman 1992). In this article we chart the roles 
of  equal  employment  opportunity  law,  personnel  managers,  and the 
courts in designating internal labor market (ILM)  practices as appropriate 
means to the prevention of discrimination and  to the efficient allocation of 
human capital. We review arguments made by rationalist organizations 
theorists and labor economists about why managers adopt ILM practices, 
and we show that, net of  the variables those theorists point to, changes 
in EEO law have a marked effect on the incidence of  these practices. 
Before the  1930s, firms were organized to recruit almost exclusively 
from the external labor market, and they seldom promoted current em- 
ployees to fill open  positions  (Jacoby  1985). Public  organizations were 
more likely to use civil service practices that facilitated internal promo- 
tion, but civil service systems were far from universal in the public sector 
(DiPrete 1989; Tolbert and Zucker 1983). By the 1950s internal promo- 
tion  systems  had become  widespread: William  Whyte's  The Organiza- 
tions Man (1956) characterized them as emblematic of the modern organi- 
zation and as the driving force behind corporate careerism. Under what 
circumstances do organizations adopt practices that facilitate the recruit- 
ment of  existing employees to fill open positions? Below we use event- 
history techniques to analyze the adoption of  six bureaucratic personnel 
practices that are integral to ILMs: formal job descriptions, performance 
evaluations, salary classification systems, job ladders, employment tests, 
and promotion tests. Our focus is not on whether firms practice internal 
promotion, but on whether they employ the bureaucratic rules associated 
with ILMs (Stark 1986, p. 493). 
PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNAL LABOR MARKETS 
Since the time of  Max Weber (1978, p.  957), who saw career-oriented 
employment structures as part and parcel of bureaucracy, most analysts 
have  made efficiency  arguments to  explain  formal internal promotion 
systems. Recent rationalist works suggest that increases in organizational 
size lead to differentiation and specialization and, in turn, to the formal- 
ization of  a wide range of activities, including personnel activities (Blau 
et al. 1976). Blau and Schoenherr (1971) and Pugh, Hickson, and Hinings 
(1969) have found that, indeed, large organizations are more likely to American Journal of  Sociology 
adopt personnel practices, such as formal job descriptions, that are asso- 
ciated  with ILMs.  Large  organizations  have  also  been  found to  offer 
better  promotion  opportunities than small  ones (Phelps Brown  1977), 
which may suggest that they are more likely to use internal promotion 
schemes. 
Peter  Doeringer  and Michael  Piore's  (1971) seminal  Internal  Labor 
Markets  and  Manpower Analysis  sought to  reconcile  the existence  of 
ILMs with neoclassical economic views-which  suggest that free compe- 
tition in open labor markets is ultimately efficient-by  arguing that ILMs 
help companies to retain firm-specific skills and reward workers for de- 
veloping such skills. In technologically advanced sectors, employees must 
learn complex skills on the job  and employers use the carrot of  promo- 
tions to persuade such workers to stay with the firm. Oliver Williamson's 
(1975) transaction costs approach offers a similar hypothesis: employers 
with complex technologies  will pursue long-term employment arrange- 
ments in order to escape the high cost of  training new workers.  These 
arguments suggest that ILMs should be  found  in technologically  ad- 
vanced industries that depend on firm-specific  skills. Neo-Marxists em- 
phasize control over the work force rather than efficiency, but they pre- 
dict that ILMs will appear in these very sectors (Edwards 1979; Gordon, 
Edwards, and Reich  1982). These approaches also suggest that labor- 
intensive, service-sector  industries that do not utilize firm-specific skills 
will be unlikely to adopt ILMs.' 
Another sort of  efficiency argument suggests that firms will adopt for- 
mal ILM practices in response to competitive pressures from the external 
labor market. When internal promotion schemes are provided by compet- 
ing organizations, managers will implement them to retain existing work- 
ers and attract new ones. This suggests that the prevalence, or density, 
of  a practice in the sample should be positively related to the likelihood 
of  adoption. 
By contrast, conflict approaches point to struggles over the terms of 
employment  between  personnel  professionals  and labor  leaders.  In a 
cross-sectional analysis of  data collected in the late  1960s, Pfeffer and 
Cohen (1984; Cohen and Pfeffer  1986) find that factors associated with 
efficiency do not predict ILMs. Instead, ILMs depend on the relative 
power  of  personnel  managers,  who favor ILMs because  they  expand 
personnel activities, and unions, who oppose ILMs because they under- 
' We also operationalized labor economists' arguments with a number of  sector-level 
variables that are thought to tap firm-specific skills and labor-market characteristics: 
capital-labor  ratio (capital expenditures  + labor expenditures) and percentages  of 
managerial employees, professional employees, black employees, and female employ- 
ees. These factors showed no effects in multivariate models, but we hesitate to draw 
conclusions because they are measured at the sectoral level. EEO Law 
mine union authority over jobs. The presence of  a personnel department 
should increase the likelihood an organization will install ILM practices; 
the presence of a union should decrease the likelihood. 
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT LAW AND INTERNAL LABOR MARKETS 
We stress wider institutional  forces that operate through public policy, 
the courts, and personnel professionals.  In recent decades American law 
and public institutions have elaborated rights for diverse categories of 
individuals and have developed standard organizational models for incor- 
porating such rights. We see these general institutional processes as creat- 
ing widespread adaptations in all sorts of  organizations over time. 
Strict, ahistorical, efficiency explanations of the proliferation of  ILMs 
have been  challenged by recent historical studies that examine the role 
of  such institutional  factors in the changing construction  of  efficiency. 
In 1935 the Wagner  Act legitimized industrial unions  and established 
mechanisms to protect union  organizing efforts. In response  employers 
began to hire personnel professionals  who advocated ILM mechanisms 
to counter unionism (Jacoby  1985). During World War I1 the War Pro- 
duction Board, the War Labor Board, and the War Manpower Commis- 
sion exercised controls over labor mobility, employment practices, and 
wages in order to ensure stability in sectors that contributed to the war 
effort. Personnel professionals responded by promoting ILM mechanisms 
to facilitate federal accountability and rationalize the use of  human re- 
sources (Baron, Dobbin, and Jennings  1986). Michael Burawoy (1985, 
p. 142) offers a slightly different argument about the role of federal policy: 
the Wagner Act (1935), the National War Labor Board (1942-46),  and 
the Taft-Hartley  Act  (1947) narrowed the scope of  union  bargaining, 
which led unions to guard member prerogatives by pushing for formal 
rules governing wage rates, job duties, promotions, and seniority. Such 
rules became key to ILMs. Data from the 1930s and 1940s support these 
arguments and show that ahistorical efficiency arguments poorly predict 
where ILM practices will  appear (Baron et al.  1986). We find that in 
more recent years, public policy changes associated with civil rights and 
equal employment opportunity have had a similarly profound impact on 
the growth of the personnel function (Kochan and Cappelli 1984, p. 146). 
Broadly speaking, we believe the institutional forces-in  the polity, the 
legal system, and personnel doctrine-that  supported ILM mechanisms 
between the 1960s and the 1980s reflect a general expansion in the social 
construction of  the individual (Thomas et al.  1987). This expanded con- 
ception  of  the individual-embodied  in public concern and legislation 
about the status of  women, minorities, the handicapped, and disadvan- 
taged groups generally-contrasts  distinctly with previous organizational American Journal of  Sociology 
constructions of  the individual. In particular, the creation of formal ILM 
mechanisms for all categories of employees symbolically transformed peo- 
ple who were traditionally disadvantaged into ambitious, occupationally 
mobile individuals. Thus ambition and self-actualization came to be rep- 
resented as characteristics of  all individuals, not just white males. 
This new managerial conception of  workerlindividual  was distinctly 
different from the conceptions Bendix (1956), and others, charted in early 
management practices. At the turn of  the century the Darwinist "drive 
system"  suggested  that human motivation was a  matter  of  short-term 
reward and punishment (Slichter 1919). Later Taylor's (1911) rationalist 
logic made it the duty of  managers to optimize the match between em- 
ployee and job  through testing and training: "The  worker came to be 
viewed as an embodiment of  aptitudes" (Bendix 1956, p. 308). The labor 
strife of  the 1910s and 1920s led to a paternalistic managerial strategy, 
based  on welfare  work  and on company unions, that represented  the 
worker as capable of devotion to the organization that could win his heart 
and mind with benevolence (Brandes 1976). The subsequent growth of 
unions led  to  the institutionalization  of  a  new and highly  contractual 
"industrial relations"  regime by the end of  the 1940s, in which motiva- 
tion came to depend on the long-range incentives embodied by seniority 
practices (Edwards 1979; Baron et al. 1986; Burawoy 1985). 
Between the mid-1960s and the early 1980s, public policy, case law, 
and prevailing personnel ideology emphasized employment practices that 
carried a new vision of the individual and a new logic of human motiva- 
tion. The personnel practices that symbolized the employee as motivated 
by reward and punishment (the drive system), as a self-interested cog in 
the wheel of  production with a limited capacity to learn (Taylorism), as a 
malleable political entity (welfare work), or as member of  an oppositional 
interest group whose actions demanded legal restraint (the industrial rela- 
tions approach), gave way to practices that represent the individual as 
self-actualizing,  future  directed,  and  psychologically  complex  (Cole 
1989). Some trends in employment practices were conspicuously oriented 
to this conception of  the individual and individual rights. Organization 
development  (OD) programs  offered  a  management  approach  based 
firmly in psychology (Kochan and Cappelli 1984, p. 150). Sexual harass- 
ment policies  aimed to protect the physical  and psychological integrity 
of  the employee.  Employment-at-will  clauses were designed to protect 
firms from employee claims to a newly articulated right to life-long em- 
ployment  (Sutton et  al. in  press).  The quality-of-work-life  movement 
promoted collective decision making, in part to improve employee mo- 
rale,  and advocated  the "enrichment,"  "enlargement,"  or "humaniza- 
tion" of jobs by reversing the trend toward job simplification (Cole 1989). 
In this article we show that even ILM mechanisms diffused in response EEO  Law 
to the elaboration of  this new logic. In particular, organizations installed 
formal ILM mechanisms to protect the rights of  all classes of  employees 
to self-actualizing, career-oriented employment, in response to shifts in 
the legal environment. Those legal changes led managers to view formal 
hiring and promotion practices not merely as means to promote equity, 
but as means to promote efficiency  by depersonalizing decisions about 
the use  of  human  resources  and thereby (a) matching employees  with 
jobs  based on their abilities rather than on ascribed characteristics and 
(b) creating incentives for all classes of  employees to excel. 
The Transformation of the Legal Environment 
Because  America's  "weak"  federal  state  seldom  dictates  behavior  to 
private actors-even  corporate actors-analysts  have tended to assume 
that it has little effect on the institutions of  civil society (Hamilton and 
Sutton 1989). While the federal government rarely mandates the use of 
particular organizational practices, public policies frequently lead to clear 
models of  organizational  compliance.  Federal law typically establishes 
broad guidelines for behavior, and corporate actors respond by designing 
practical compliance strategies that are in turn reviewed by courts and 
administrative agencies.  Once approved, organizationally devised solu- 
tions act as prescriptions for legal compliance (Hamilton and Sutton 1989; 
Edelman  1992; Abzug  and Mezias  1993). For instance, Neil  Fligstein 
(1990) shows that organizations responded  to antimonopoly  policies  by 
experimenting with vertical integration and diversification  and that the 
courts then approved these solutions. While the creation of  compliance 
mechanisms is iterative and haphazard in the United States, the mecha- 
nisms that emerge from this process become powerful institutional mod- 
els, not unlike the solutions directly mandated by "strong"  states (Meyer 
and Scott 1983). We suggest that the effects of  U.S. policy on organiza- 
tions are interesting precisely because compliance mechanisms are often 
worked out between organizations and the state. 
In support of  our hypotheses outlining the salience of the legal environ- 
ment, cross-national studies suggest that nation-state characteristics are 
excellent  predictors  of  organizational  employment  practices,  whereas 
neoclassical economic variables have little predictive power. In a study 
of  12 matched companies in Germany and France, Maurice, Sellier, and 
Silvestre  (1984) show that size,  product, and technology  explain little 
about how job hierarchies will be structured; instead, national historical 
differences explain  much  of  the variance (see also Dore  1973; Lincoln 
and Kalleberg 1985; Maurice, Sorge, and Warner 1980). 
We will argue that equal employment opportunity law led organiza- 
tions to formalize promotion mechanisms to undermine managerial dis- American Journal of  Sociology 
crimination. How do we know that organizations did not simply adopt 
these measures in response to the civil rights and womens' movements? 
Of  course these movements were important, but their broad effects do 
not explain the fact that organizational  antidiscrimination policies  con- 
verged  on a  set of  personnel  practices  that were isomorphic with the 
procedurally oriented, quasi-judicial administrative configuration of  the 
federal government-formal,  merit-based, employment and promotion 
conventions complete with an internal system of  grievance adjudication 
(see Scott and Meyer 1987). Once sanctioned by the courts, this approach 
eclipsed all competing strategies for redressing discrimination. It is clear 
that, even if  social movements encouraged organizations to end discrimi- 
nation, public policy shaped the particular approach organizations would 
embrace. 
Equal employment opportunity law.-We  hypothesize that two major 
changes in the legal  environment  increased  the popularity of  internal 
labor market mechanisms. First, the passage of  the Civil Rights Act of 
1964 prompted employers to experiment with various antidiscrimination 
approaches, including (1) formal hiring and promotion procedures to de- 
personalize employment decisions, (2) sophisticated employment and pro- 
motion tests to create objective selection criteria, and (3) numerical quo- 
tas for the employment of  disadvantaged  groups. Second, in the early 
1970s legislative changes and court decisions required more employers to 
be  attentive to the issue of  discrimination, but discouraged the testing 
and quota solutions while reinforcing the ILM strategy. More generally, 
because ILM procedures operate on a classificatory logic in which certain 
categories of  employees are afforded specified protections against firing 
and promises  of  consideration for promotion (Stark 1986, p. 494), they 
were particularly well suited to protecting rights for new classifications 
based on gender and minority status. 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of  1964 made it illegal for employers 
with  100 or more employees to discriminate on the basis of  race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin. These protections were extended to per- 
sons between the ages of  40 and 65  in  1967 and to the physically and 
mentally impaired in 1973 (Farley 1979, p. 12). The new Equal Employ- 
ment  Opportunity  Commission  (EEOC) was  charged with  overseeing 
Title VII of  the act. In September 1965 President Johnson issued Execu- 
tive Order (EO) 11246, which required federal agencies as well as major 
federal contractors and subcontractors, and unions covering employees 
who work for them, to take what came to be called "affirmative action" 
to  redress  inequality.  Employers  associated  with  contracts  of  over 
$10,000 were required to practice affirmative action, and those associated 
with  contracts over  $50,000 were required to write affirmative  action 
plans. Executive Order 11246 was to be enforced by the Department of EEO Law 
Labor's Office of  Federal Contract Compliance (OFCC),  later named the 
OFCC Programs (OFCCP; see  Burstein  1985; Edelman  1990). While 
federal enforcement was notoriously weak during this period (Ashenfelter 
and Heckmann  1976, p. 46), the threat of  private litigation compelled 
corporate  actors to  be  attentive  to the law. Thus many organizations 
responded to Title VII and EO 11246 by designating affirmative action 
officers,  and establishing  affirmative  action  offices,  between  1964 and 
1970 (Edelman 1990). 
In the early 1970s several judicial and administrative clarifications of 
EEO compliance criteria discouraged  the use  of  tests and quotas and 
encouraged the adoption of  formal ILM mechanisms. First, in Griggs v. 
Duke Power Company (401 U.S. 424, 1971), the Supreme Court outlawed 
employment tests that were not demonstrably related to the work to be 
performed if  those tests had the effect of  excluding blacks. In ruling that 
employment  tests  must  be  relevant  to  job  tasks  the  Supreme  Court 
spurred firms  to  specify job  prerequisites,  in written job  descriptions, 
and discouraged  them  from using  general  employment  tests.  In  1974 
EEOC guidelines  explicitly  stated that education, experience, and test 
scores could not be used as selection criteria unless they could be shown 
to be related to job performance (U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission  1974, pp.  35-40).  Few employers were  able to convince 
the courts that their tests could predict job  performance  (Burstein and 
Pitchford  1990) and, as a result, many ceased  using testing to achieve 
EEO goals. 
Second, in the early 1970s, discrimination and reverse-discrimination 
suits increased in number. Between  1965 and 1970 only three reverse- 
discrimination  suits reached  appellate courts, yet in  the next six-year 
period 24 such suits were heard (Burstein 1990; Burstein and Monaghan 
1986, p. 380). These suits made employers reluctant to follow compliance 
strategies, such as quotas, that explicitly gave an edge to disadvantaged 
groups. Voluntary quotas (i.e., those not mandated by courts) had never 
been  the favored EEO compliance  strategy (Burstein  1985), and now 
several  well-publicized  judgments  found  them  to  be  illegal  (Leonard 
1985). In addition, the General Accounting Office's interpretation of  the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Act of  1972 rejected the use of  quotas 
in the federal Civil Service on the grounds that quotas would undermine 
the merit system (DiPrete 1989, p. 199). This interpretation caused both 
public and private  employers to retreat from voluntary quotas and to 
expand the formalization of  hiring and promotion. 
Third, in December  1971 the OFCCP issued Revised Order 4, which 
set out specific affirmative action guidelines for federal contractors. The 
order required federal contractors to file annual EEO reports detailing 
employment in each job  category by gender, race,  and ethnicity.  The American Journal of  Sociology 
order also called for affirmative action plans to identify areas of  minority 
and female "underutilization," to develop numerical  goals and timeta- 
bles for enlarging job opportunities in those areas, and to specify mecha- 
nisms for evaluating program effectiveness (Leonard 1985). 
Fourth, the 1972 Equal Employment Opportunity Act gave the EEOC 
the authority to bring suit in federal court under Title VII; the act also 
extended Title VII coverage to private employers with  15 or more em- 
ployees, to educational institutions, and to state and local governments. 
This legislation simultaneously expanded the scope of  federal EEO law 
and  strengthened  the  capacity  for  active  enforcement.  Finally,  the 
EEOC's  1974 guidebook  for  employers, AfJirmative  Action and Equal 
Employment, suggested that employers could avoid litigation by formaliz- 
ing hiring and promotion  procedures and expanding personnel  record 
keeping so that they would be able to prove that they did not discriminate 
(Benokraitis and Feagin 1977).~ 
Personnel Professionals 
Personnel professionals played a central role in constructing formal ILM 
practices as EEO compliance, mechanisms.  Personnel departments typi- 
cally implement and administer ILMs, and they have promoted ILMs to 
serve a series of management problems since early in this century (Jacoby 
1984). We argue that personnel departments provided the path through 
which ILM mechanisms diffused in the years after the Civil Rights Act. 
Personnel professionals responded to the ambiguity of  the 1964 legisla- 
tion  by developing the three principal  antidiscrimination  strategies we 
have discussed: quota systems, tests designed to objectively evaluate the 
qualifications of job candidates, and rules to formalize hiring and promo- 
tion. The personnel and business management journals published articles 
advocating all  three  strategies  between  the  mid-1960s  and mid-1970s 
(e.g., Bell  197 1; Bassford  1974). Personnel managers also came to extol 
affirmative action-related  formalization as a way to rationalize personnel 
allocation: open bidding for jobs would undermine favoritism and peri- 
odic,  written,  performance  evaluations  would  encourage  promotions 
based on objective criteria (Haward  Law Review 1989, p. 669). Personnel 
managers sold their bosses on formal evaluation and promotion systems 
The report argued that if  an EEO survey shows that women and minorities are not 
employed in an organization "at all levels in reasonable relation to their presence in 
the population  and the labor force, the burden of  proof  is on  .  . . [the employer] to 
show that this is not the result of  discrimination, however inadvertent" (Farley 1979, 
p. vi). EEO Law 
with two arguments: these systems thwarted discrimination and, at the 
same time, rationalized the allocation of  human resources. Their rhetoric 
coupled the ideas of  equity and efficiency. 
Job  descriptions, pe$ormance  evaluations, and salary classification.- 
In the early 1970s, in response to the OFCCP's Revised Order 4 and the 
1972 expansion of the EEOC's authority, the major practitioner journals 
began  publishing articles that promoted a specific set of  ILM practices 
to improve federal accountability and to redress discrimination.  For in- 
stance, in  1974 the Harvard  Business Review published  "Make  Your 
Equal Opportunity Program Court-Proof," which emphasized "the need 
for positive action against the risk of  prolonged  and serious litigation or 
crippling financial judgments."  It specifically encouraged firms to estab- 
lish nondiscriminatory job descriptions and salary classification systems 
and to "ensure that prescribed qualifications and pay scales can be justi- 
fied on business  grounds and that inadvertent barriers  have not been 
erected against women  and minorities"  (Chayes  1974, p.  81; see  also 
Kochan and Cappelli 1984, p. 147). In the same year, the journal Person-
nel  published  "A  Total Approach  to  EEO Compliance"  (Giblin  and 
Ornati 1974), which argued that affirmative action programs must begin 
with a census of  minority and women employees in each department and 
within  each  major job  classification-which  required  having a  salary 
classification  system in place-and  encouraged employers to implement 
periodic performance evaluations for all categories of  employees to make 
all  employees eligible for promotion.  Written performance evaluations 
were also thought to be essential to the successful defense of  discrimina- 
tion suits involving promotions. In brief, the personnel journals promoted 
salary classification  systems, job  descriptions,  and formal performance 
evaluations as EEO compliance  mechanism^.^ These articles noted that 
salary classification systems, and expanded record keeping in the areas 
of  hiring and promotion, were now virtually mandatory for federal con- 
tractors who were required to file annual EEO reports.  Evidence that 
federal contractors expanded black male employment in response to fed- 
eral oversight (Ashenfelter and Heckmann  1976; Leonard  19848) leads 
us to predict that these contractors were also likely to adopt ILM mecha- 
nisms. 
Many of these articles treated EEO law as an opportunity to increase 
the efficiency of personnel decisions. Executives soon recognized that by 
One article in the Harvard Business Review not only advocated performance evalua- 
tions,  but recommended separate performance evaluations to assess managers' affir- 
mative action performance (Purcell 1974). American Journal of  Sociology 
requiring  middle  managers  to justify  hiring  and promotion  decisions, 
they could undermine favoritism and ensure that jobs would be filled by 
the best-qualified  applicants. As Robert J. Samuelson argued in  1984, 
"Many firms have overhauled personnel  policies.  . . . Promotions  are 
less informal.  When positions  become open, they are posted  so anyone 
(not just  the boss's  favorite) can apply. Formal evaluations have been 
strengthened  so that, when  a  manager selects one candidate over  an- 
other . . . there are objective criteria" (quoted in Harvard Law Review 
1989, p. 669). By 1979 some two-thirds of  top corporate executives fa- 
vored government efforts to increase female and minority participation 
in the labor force, and a decade later the Haward Law Review (1989) 
argued that managerial support for EEO had become  widespread  be- 
cause EEO was seen as a force promoting rational personnel practices. 
Alternative  economic  analyses  reinforce  this  view  by  suggesting  that 
EEO encourages employers to match employees with jobs on the basis 
of  their abilities rather than on the basis of  irrelevant ascribed character- 
istics  (Lundberg  1991; Donohue  1986). Thus while  neoclassical  econo- 
mists argued that antidiscrimination laws were inefficient because  they 
disrupted  market mechanisms  and unnecessary because  discriminatory 
practices would eventually die under the weight of  their own inefficiency 
(Becker 1971; Friedman 1962), business executives came to see EEO as 
a source of increased efficiency. 
Job ladders, testing, and quotas.-By  contrast, personnel journals sug- 
gested that formal job ladders, testing, and quota schemes could lead to 
problems with the EEOC and OFCCP. Formal job ladders had not been 
part of  any of  the three main EEO compliance strategies devised in the 
1960s, and in the 1970s they were found to produce unnecessary barriers 
to advancement by making only certain groups of employees eligible for 
promotion.  Giblin  and  Ornati  counseled  that  firms  should  examine 
whether their promotion ladders "create unwarranted restrictions to mi- 
nority  mobility"  and, in particular,  whether "women  or minorities are 
concentrated  in  certain jobs  outside  any line of  progression  or in jobs 
that dead-end"  (1974,  p.  40).  DiPrete  (1989,  p.  197) argues  that the 
problem with job ladders was quite simple: most organizations had differ- 
ent, discontinuous, upper- and lower-tier job ladders. Employees in the 
lower tier, frequently dominated by women and minorities, were gener- 
ally ineligible for promotion to upper-tier jobs even if  they held the neces- 
sary educational qualifications  (see also  Halle  1984). Federal  agencies 
responded to EEO legislation by creating bridges between job ladders in 
different tiers (DiPrete 1989), but the personnel journals  urged private 
employers to switch to open bidding systems that allowed any employee 
to bid for a vacant job-such  systems had already substituted for formal EEO Law 
job  ladders in  several  industries (Burawoy 1985, p.  133).'  Thus after 
about 1973 job  ladders were incorporated into some government EEO 
programs, but were less likely to be used in private-sector programs. 
A number of  personnel administrators initially believed that employ- 
ment and promotion testing could solve their EEO problems. Since the 
time of  Frederick Taylor, testing had been  viewed as a way to ensure 
that workers would be allocated to "the highest class of  jobs"  that they 
were capable of  performing, thereby maximizing both their own rewards 
and their utility to the organization (Bendix 1956, p. 2 79; Taylor 191  1). 
Personnel managers reacted to the 1971 Griggs decision, which required 
them to demonstrate the relevance of  tests, in two ways: some saw this 
ruling as a chance to expand their departments by developing more so- 
phisticated  tests that would  predict job  performance  and stand up to 
EEOC guidelines (Campbell 1973; Slevin 1973; Gavin and Toole  1973; 
Gorham 1972; National Civil Service League 1973), while others advo- 
cated the abandonment of  testing. The second camp came to prevail. A 
study conducted in 1973 and reported in Personnel found that 15.1% of 
sampled firms had already abandoned employment tests in reaction to 
the Griggs decision  (Peterson  1974).~  Similarly, in our sample,  15% of 
the  organizations  using  employment tests abandoned them during the 
period under study, and 11% of  the organizations using promotion tests 
abandoned them. By contrast, no other practice was abandoned by more 
than 2% of  the organizations using it. 
The reverse-discrimination suits of  the early 1970s led personnel man- 
agers to repudiate schemes, such as quotas, that explicitly advantaged 
protected groups. While court orders and consent decrees had required 
some companies to conform to specific black-white or female-male hiring 
ratios,  the voluntary  establishment of  quotas had led  to  a  number  of 
legal fights (Haward Law Review  1989; Burstein and Monaghan  1986; 
Leonard 1984~).  By 1974 personnel experts were advising their colleagues 
that voluntary quotas could "render them liable to legal attack" (Chayes 
1974, p.  87). In 1978 the widely  publicized Bakke  case led  personnel 
managers  who had  not yet  done so  to excise  the word  "quota"  from 
their personnel guidelines. 
'A 1973 how-to article on affirmative action for women thus advocated the "institu- 
tion of  a method of  job posting so that all employees are aware of  vacancies as they 
occur and that promotion into these vacancies is based on qualifications, not sex" or 
prior position (Slevin 1973, p. 30). 
Small firms were  most likely  to abandon testing,  in  part because  they could not 
produce sufficient data to demonstrate that tests predicted job  performance (Walsh 
and Hess 1974). American Journal of  Sociology 
Finally,  public and nonprofit organizations were most susceptible to 
these trends because these organizations (a) depend on public opinion for 
legitimacy and resources and (b) are subject to evaluation on the basis of 
their use  of  up-to-date procedures  and structures because  they cannot, 
in most cases, be judged on the basis of  profitability (Zucker 1983; Meyer 
and Scott 1983; Scott 1987; Meyer and Rowan 1977). Other studies (e.g., 
Dobbin et al.  1988) have shown such organizations to be most likely to 
install formal affirmative action offices and procedures. To  the extent that 
organizations adopt ILM mechanisms to symbolize their commitment to 
equality,  rather  than to  retain  firm-specific  skills  as labor economists 
suggest, we should find that the likelihood of  adoption is highest among 
public and nonprofit organizations, rather than among technically com- 
plex organizations. 
In sum, we suggest hypotheses about the spread of  ILM mechanisms 
that challenge traditional arguments. First, whereas neoclassical and ra- 
tionalist arguments treat separate ILM practices as integral parts of  a 
whole, and predict incremental increases in their popularity as firm size 
and complexity  increase,  our arguments suggest that EEO law should 
affect adoption of  these practices differently and that two broad shifts in 
the legal environment should produce dramatic, stepwise changes in the 
likelihood of  adoption. The personnel profession came to reject two early 
solutions to employment discrimination, testing and quotas, in  reaction 
to case law. As a result, the likelihood of  adopting tests should increase 
in the  period  between  1964 and about  1973, but should  not increase 
thereafter. After 1964, personnel managers began using job descriptions, 
performance evaluations, and salary classification systems to codify and 
depersonalize employment and promotion decisions. When case law rein- 
forced these solutions in the early 1970s, personnel professionals pursued 
them with new vigor; thus adoption should rise after 1964 and again in 
the early 1970s. Initially personnel managers saw no EEO benefits in the 
formal job ladders that had traditionally been part of ILMs, but because 
job  ladders were included in  government EEO programs in the early 
1970s, we  expect their incidence to rise  from  1973. Second, personnel 
professionals and affirmative action officers helped to develop and diffuse 
these compliance strategies, both individually and through their profes- 
sional associations. Thus organizations with personnel departments and 
affirmative action offices should be susceptible to adoption. Third, public 
policy required  federal contractors and some other organizations to file 
annual EEO reports. Such organizations should be likely to adopt ILM 
mechanisms. Fourth, public sector and  nonprofit organizations have been 
especially attentive to personnel procedures that confer legitimacy, and 
we expect  they will  prove  susceptible to the adoption of  ILM mecha- 
nisms. EEO Law 
DATA AND METHODS 
The Sample 
We selected a stratified random sample of  public,  for-profit, and non- 
profit  organizations in  1985-86,  collecting retrospective data from  279 
organizations on the history of  their personnel practices. We generated 
the sample in three states-California,  New Jersey, and Virginia-that 
have  varying legal  environments  (Edelman et al.  1990; Sutton  et  al. 
1994). We concentrated on a limited number of  sectors, which represent 
different parts  of  the economy,  so that we would  be  able to  examine 
arguments about sectoral effects. In each state we selected an equal num- 
ber of  organizations from each of  13 sectors. 
The difficulties associated with sampling organizations have been well 
documented (Kalleberg et al.  1990). We chose the most complete pub- 
lished list of  organizations available for each sector. Our source for firms 
in publishing, banking, chemicals, machinery, electrical manufacturing, 
retail  trade,  and transportation  was  Dun's  Million  Dollar Directory, 
which lists all publicly traded firms with assets of  at least $500,000. We 
sampled hospitals from the directory of  the American Hospital Associa- 
tion (1983) and nonprofits from the Encyclopedia of  Associations  (1985). 
To sample organizations in the public sector we used commercial tele- 
phone directories as well as official state and federal government directo- 
ries. We sampled randomly from each source. We had only four criteria 
for inclusion in the study: that the organization was currently operating, 
that it was located in one of the three states selected, that it operated in 
one of  the 13 sectors, and that it employed at least 50 persons.  Smaller 
organizations  were  excluded  because  previous  studies  suggested  that 
very  few  of  them  would  use  formal  employment practices.  We  con-
tacted selected  organizations to ascertain whether they met these four 
criteria. 
Response rate.-We  contacted 620 organizations that met the inclusion 
criteria, and we received  completed questionnaires from exactly 300 of 
them-a  response  rate of  48%.'  Despite  the fact that we  telephoned 
respondents, and other members of their organizations, in order to clarify 
responses and fill in blanks, we had to exclude 21 of  the 300 question- 
naires from the analysis due to the poor quality of  the data. This brings 
the successful completion rate down to 45%, which compares favorably 
with other organizational studies: Blau et al. (1976) report a rate of  36%, 
Lincoln and Kalleberg (1985) a rate of  35%, and Edelman (1992) a rate 
' We were never able to contact 86 of  the nonrespondents to determine whether they 
met the sampling criteria. To calculate the response rate we assume that this entire 
group would have met the criteria. American Journal of  Sociology 
of  54% for a telephone interview. We believe that our sample exaggerates 
the use of  ILM practices because having a personnel office may increase 
the likelihood of  adopting ILM practices and of  participating in our sur- 
vey. This points to a possible problem with sample selection bias; how- 
ever, the event-history framework we use minimizes this problem. That 
is, the data set includes many cases (annual organizational spells) without 
personnel  departments, particularly in  the early years.  Bias  may also 
result from the fact that our retrospective data collection effort necessarily 
excludes failed organizations. The only realistic remedy would be longitu- 
dinal data collection which, if  begun in 1985, would have prevented us 
from examining the historical processes of  interest. 
Measurement and Model Specification 
Dependent variables.-We  examine the rate of  adoption of  six personnel 
practices: job descriptions, performance evaluations, salary classification 
systems, job ladders, employment testing, and promotion testing. Formal 
job  descriptions outline the work to be  performed  in each job  and the 
prerequisites for job applicants; they thereby enable the organization to 
identify a pool of  internal candidates for each vacant position. Periodic, 
written pe$ormance  evaluations are conducted by supervisors and results 
are kept on record for use  in promotion  decisions.  Salary classi$cation 
systems arrange jobs in a series of hierarchical wage categories based on 
requisite  duties and skills; the creation of  categories that are consistent 
across departments enables managers to determine which job shifts con- 
stitute lateral moves and which constitute vertical moves. Each formal 
job  ladder specifies a succession of  jobs in a sequence that constitute an 
expected  promotion  pattern. Written  employment  tests  are designed  to 
evaluate applicants' intelligence, experience, and personal character in 
order to match them with jobs,  and promotion  tests are used to judge 
current employees  for promotion.  It is  important to  note  that formal 
ILM procedures may be poor indicators of whether organizations practice 
internal promotion, because organizations that lack these procedures may 
nonetheless routinely promote from within and organizations with these 
procedures may routinely hire from the external labor market. 
To code each practice in event-history format, we asked respondents 
whether their organization had ever used the practice. For each affirma- 
tive response, we coded the year in which the practice was first used; 
if  the practice  had been  abandoned we  coded  the year  in  which  that 
occurred. 
Independent variables.-Table  1 lists the independent variables.  All 
vary over time, and all but the time periods, time trend, and density are 
measured at the organizational level.  Our predictions about the effects -  -- 
EEO Law 
Variable 

Log employment  .......................... 

Personnel office  ............................ 

Member of  personnel association  ..... 

Period 2  ..................
 .... ............. 

TABLE 1 
Description 
Natural logarithm of  the number of  employees 
reported in the current year 
Binary variable for presence of  a personnel of- 
fice in the current year 
Binary variable for membership in a personnel 
association in current year 
Binary variable for spells occurring between 
1964 and 1973, inclusive 
Period 3  ....................... ........  Binary variable for spells occurring between 
1974 and 1985, inclusive 
Time trend  .................................  Linear variable representing years since 1954 
(1-30) 
Chemicals, machinery, electrical, 
nonprofit  ....................... .....  Binary variable for organization operating in 
the sector 
City, county, federal government  .....  Binary variable for government agency 
Density (for each ILM practice)*  .....  Percentage of  firms in the sample reporting the 
use of  the practice in current year 

Federal contractor*  ......................  Binary variable for federal contracts in current 

year (limited to private organizations) 

EEO reporting status*  ..................  Binary variable for organizations that filed an 

EEO report with the EEOC or the OFCCP 

in current year (limited to private organiza- 

tions) 

AA officeiofficer*  Binary variable for presence of  affirmative ac- 
tion office, or designated officer, in current 
year 
Union  contract*  .........................  Binary variable for presence of  union contract 

in current year 

* These variables are excluded  from the results  reported in tables 3-7  as they showed no effects in 
multivariate analyses. 
of  policy shifts vary. The omitted period is  1955-63  (c,), the first phase 
of  EEO law is  1964-73  (c,), and the second phase is  1974-85  (c,). For 
job  descriptions,  performance evaluations, and salary classification we 
predict that c, < c, < c,.  For employment and promotion tests we predict 
that c, < c,  > c,.  We predict that the rate of  adoption of  job  ladders 
will rise only in the third period, and principally for public organizations. 
The  sectoral  variables  represent  neoclassical  arguments  about  firm- 
specific skills (i.e., chemical, machinery, electrical equipment industries) 
and institutional arguments about what types of  employers are suscepti- 
ble to new procedural norms (nonprofit and government organizations). American Journal of  Sociology 
Estimation 
Before turning to methods and modeling, we show changes in the preva- 
lence of  the six personnel practices.  Figure  1 reports the proportion  of 
existing  organizations  that  used  each  of  the  practices  in  each  year. 
Changes are dramatic over time. While a small proportion of  organiza- 
tions used performance evaluations, job descriptions, and salary classifi- 
cation  systems  in  1955, a  majority of  sampled firms used  these three 
practices by 1985. It is evident that these first three practices grew more 
quickly between  1964 and 1973 than they did before  1964; they grew 
even  more quickly  between  1974 and 1985. By contrast,  employment 
tests, which were at  first more prevalent than any other practice, diverge 
notably from the first  three practices  after the early  1960s. Promotion 
tests and job ladders rise very slowly in absolute terms. Table 2  reports 
the average annual hazard rate for each of  the six outcomes, in each of 
the three policy periods. These figures tell a similar story about the posi- 
tive effects of legal changes on the first three variables in both periods 2 
and 3. They also support our hypothesis that job ladders should increase 
in period 3, and that employment testing should increase between periods 
1 and 2  but not between periods 2  and 3. 
Tables  3-7  present  loglinear  event-history  models,  estimated  with 
Tuma's RATE program, for five of the six ILM practices. Over the 30-year 
time frame we cover, the 279 organizations sampled yield  6,701 annual 
l-
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FIG.1.-Proportion  of  sample with ILM practices EEO Law 
TABLE 2 
AVERAGE  ANNUAL  HAZARD  RATE FOR  EACH  INTERNAL  LABOR  MARKET  PRACTICE 
ILM Practice 
Period  1 
(1955-63) 
Period 2 
(1964-73) 
Period 3 
(1974-85) 
Job descriptions  .......................... 
Performance evaluations  ............... 
Salary classification  ..................... 
Job ladders  ..................... ......... 
Employment testing ..................... 
Promotion testing  ........................ 
,015 
,011 
,013 
,005 
,009 
,006 
,036 
,039 
,031 
,009 
,024 
,007 
,095 
,099 
,061 
,017 
,023 
,004 
spells of  observation. In the models, organizations are excluded from the 
at-risk pool  before their birth, and after they have adopted a practice. 
The number  of  at-risk spells  ranges from  3,400 to 5,396 for  the five 
modeled outcomes. The number of  transitions modeled ranges from 61 
to 164. We treat as left censored organizations that adopted the modeled 
practice before 1955 as well as those founded after 1955 that started out 
with the modeled practice. For each outcome we present equations that 
include, in addition to other variables, (1) the two binary time-period 
variables representing  changes in EEO law, (2) a time-trend  variable, 
and (3) the time-period variables as well as the time trend. Our aim here 
is to discern either a linear increase in the likelihood  of  adopting ILM 
practices, which might be caused by any number of  factors, or stepwise 
increases  that correspond  to legal  changes.  We also report the effects 
of  the two time-period variables and the time-trend variable separately 
because they are multicollinear. 
FINDINGS 
Rationalist arguments are weakly supported by our analyses. Contrary 
to  rationalist  arguments that size  is  the most important cause  of  the 
formalization  of  organizational  personnel  practices,  employment  size 
shows significant effects for only two of the outcome variables. Neoclassi- 
cal economic arguments that organizations employ ILMs to guard firm- 
specific skills in capital-intensive,  modern sectors receive some support. 
In accord with those predictions, electrical equipment industries showed 
positive effects on two outcomes and chemical industries showed an effect 
on one. Machinery produced no significant  effects. Parenthetically, we 
tested all other sectors for significant positive effects and found none. On 
the whole, public and nonprofit organizations were most likely to adopt 
these  practices,  as institutional theory predicts.  The density  measures 
representing the proportion  of  the sample with the specified practice in TABLE 3 
ESTIMATES OF FACTORS AFFECTING THE ADOPTION OF JOB  DESCRIPTIONS,  1956-85 
MEMBER  SECTOR^ 
PRESENCE  or A 
LOG  or A  PERSONNEL  City  County  Federal 
EMPLOY PERSONNEL  ASSO- PERIOD 2  PERIOD 3  TIME  Chem- Machln- Elec- Govern  Govern- Govern-
EOUATION INTERCEPT  MENT  OFFICE  CIATION  (1964-73)  (1974-85)  TREND  lcal~  ery  trical  Nonprofit  ment  ment  ment  X' 
NOTE.-No.  of cases at risk  = 223; left-censored cases = 56; no. of transitions  = 164. SEs are shown in parentheses. N  = 3,436 spells 
a Omitted sectors are publishing, banking, retail trade, transportation, hospitals, and state government. 
* P ZS  .05. ** P 5 .01. TABLE 4 
EQUATION  INTERCEPT 
MEMBER 
PRESENCE  OF  A 
LOG  or A  PERSONNEL 
EMPLOY  PERSONNEL ASSO-  PERIOD 2 
MENT  OFFICE  CIATION  (1964-73) 
PERIOD 3 
(1974-85) 
TIME 
TREND 
Chem-
icals 
Machin-
ery 
Elec-
trlcal 
SECTOR^ 
Nonprofit 
Clty 
Govern 
ment 
County 
Govern 
ment 
Federal 
Govern-
ment  ,y2 
NOTE.-NO.  of  cases at risk  = 215; left-censored cases = 64; no. of  transitions = 162, SEs are shown in parentheses. N 
a Omitted sectors are publishing, banking, retail trade, transportation,  hospitals, and state government. 
* P 5 .05. 
** P 5 .01. 
= 3,400 spells. TABLE 5 
ESTIMATES OF FACTORS AFFECTINGTHE ADOPTIONOF SALARY CLASSIFICATION, 1956-85 
EQUATION  INTERCEPT 
LOG  OF  A  PERSONNEL 
EMPLOY  PERSONNEL  ASSO  PERIOD 2 
MENT  OFFICE  CIATION  (1964-73) 
PERIOD 3 
(1974-85) 
TIME 
TREND 
Chem-
icak 
Machin 
ei-y 
Elec-
trical  Nonprofit 
City 
Govern-
ment 
County 
Govern-
ment 
Federal 
Govern-
ment  X2 
m 
(1) .......... 
(2) . .  ..  .  ..  .. 
(3) .......... 
5.906** 
(.471) 
-5.667** 
(.433) 
5.710** 
(.487) 
,135 
(.072) 
.12 1 
(.071) 
,133 
(.071) 
.?SO** 
(.207) 
.763** 
(.208) 
.763** 
(.206) 
.460 
(.240) 
,465 
(.243) 
.506* 
(.241) 
.970** 
(.323) 
1.324** 
(.404) 
1.680** 
(.315) 
2.436** 
(.609) 
.058** 
(.OlZ) 
-.040 
(.028) 
.I32 
(.382) 
,118 
(.382) 
,132 
(.382) 
,504 
(.315) 
,509 
(.315) 
507 
(.315) 
1.078** 
(.301) 
1.080** 
(.301) 
1.083** 
(.301) 
1.049** 
(.282) 
1.047** 
(.283) 
1.017** 
(.283) 
.996** 
(.366) 
.987** 
(.367) 
.980** 
(.367) 
NOTE.-NO.  of  cases at risk = 220; left-censored cases = 59; no. of  transitions = 132; SEs are shown in parentheses. N 
" Omitted sectors are publishing,  banking, retail trade, transportation, hospitals,  and state government. 
* P 5 .05. 
** P 5 .Ol. 
= 3,600 spells. TABLE 6 
ESTIMATES OF FACTORS AFFECTING THE ADOPTION OF JOB  LADDERS, 1956-85 
EQuATroN  INTERCEPT 
LOG  OF  A  PERSONNEL 
EMPLOY-  PERSONNEL  ASSO  PERIOD 2 
MENT  OFFICE  CIATION  (1964-73) 
PERIOD 3 
(1974-85) 
TIME 
TREND 
Chem-
icals 
Machin-
ery 
Elec-
trical  Nonprofit 
Clty 
Govern-
ment 
County 
Govern-
ment 
Federal 
Govern-
ment  X2 
NOTE.-No.  of  cases at risk  = 257; left-censored cases = 22; no. of  transitions  = 61; SEs are shown in parentheses. N 
a Omitted sectors are publishing, banking, retail trade, transportation, hospitals, and state government. 
* P 5 .05. 
** P 5 .01. 
= 5,396 spells TABLE 7 
ESTIMATES OF FACTORS AFFECTING THE ADOPTION OF EMPLOYMENT TESTS, 1956-85 
MEMBER 
EQUATION  INTERCEPT 
LOG 
EMPLOY-
MENT 
OF A 
PERSONNEL 
ASSO-
CIATION 
Chem-
icals 
Machln 
ery 
Elec-
tncal  Nonprofit 
C~ty 
Govern-
ment 
County 
Govern 
ment 
Federal 
Govern-
ment  X' 
,073 
(.347) 
,121 
(.347) 
-,036 
(.349) 
NOTE.-NO.  of  cases at risk  = 233; left-censored  cases = 46; no. of  transitions  = 81; SEs are shown in parentheses. N  = 4,104 spells 
" Omitted sectors are publishing, banking, retail trade, transportation, hospitals, and state government. 
* PS.05. 
** P 5 .01. EEO  Law 
the current year, which operationalize the argument that organizations 
install ILM mechanisms to compete for labor, performed well in bivariate 
analyses, but their effects disappeared in multivariate models. For parsi- 
mony we omit the density measures from the reported results, as well as 
several other variables that showed no significant effects in multivariate 
models. 
Conflict arguments do not receive  support here.  Pfeffer  and Cohen 
(1984) suggest  that  personnel  departments  have  positive  effects  and 
unions have negative effects. Their argument hinges on the struggle be- 
tween these two interests; the theory depends on our finding both effects. 
We found strong positive effects of  personnel departments, but no effects 
of  union contracts in either bivariate or multivariate models. 
Legal changes show strong effects. The time periods, which represent 
changes in the legal environment, were important in all of  our models. 
In accord with our predictions,  the period effects are consistently posi- 
tive, and the period 3 coefficients exceed the period 2  coefficients for job 
descriptions, performance evaluations, and salary classification systems. 
In equation (1) of  table 3, for instance, the constant, which represents 
the baseline  rate for the period  1955-63,  is  -5.704.  To calculate the 
change in the rate of  adoption between  periods we add the parameter 
for period  2  (1.059) to the constant, and the sum (-4.645)  shows that, 
between c, and c,,  the rate increases by about 19%. Similarly, when we 
add the parameter for period 3 to the constant, the sum (-3.540)  shows 
that the rate increases by approximately 38% between  c, and c,.  Very 
similar  findings are presented  for  performance  evaluations and salary 
classification. For job  ladders, only period 3 shows a significant effect; 
this supports DiPrete's (1989) argument that civil service systems bridged 
job  ladders to  conform  to  EEO guidelines  after the early  1970s.  For 
employment tests, the parameters for the two later periods are roughly 
equal,  which  supports our  argument  that personnel  professionals  re-
sponded to the Civil Rights Act by encouraging adoption of  such tests 
but that the legal precedents of  the early 1970s made testing difficult to 
support in court. Some organizations undertook studies to demonstrate 
that tests  predicted  job  performance,  but  many avoided testing  alto- 
gether. 
We  introduce a  time-trend  variable to evaluate whether the period 
variables actually tap a steady secular increase in adoption rather than 
the discontinuous effects of  policy shifts. If  the former is the case, the 
time-trend variable, coded from 1-30,  should wash out the effects of  the 
binary time-period variables. This is not what happens. In constrained 
models the period variables produce better results than the time trend 
variable for all five outcomes. In unconstrained models that include all 
three variables, the time trend uniformly fails to  achieve significance. American Journal of  Sociology 
For four of  the outcomes, the time-period variables that show significant 
effects in equation (1) remain significant.  For job descriptions, only pe- 
riod  2  shows significant  effects.  These results suggest that increases in 
the likelihood of  adoption were stepwise and dramatic rather than incre- 
mental. While these general measures of legal change show robust effects, 
the direct measures of  whether organizations  come under federal EEO 
scrutiny-federal  contractor  status  and  EEO  report  filing  status-
showed weak effects that did not hold up in multivariate models, hence 
we omit them from the tables. 
The presence of  a personnel office shows a positive effect on the adop- 
tion of  job descriptions, performance evaluations, and salary classifica- 
tion, which were ultimately  approved by the personnel profession  and 
the courts as EEO compliance strategies, but not on job ladders or em- 
ployment tests, which were generally discouraged by the profession and 
the courts. For one outcome, salary classification, membership in a per- 
sonnel association also shows a weak net effect. In bivariate analyses the 
presence of  an affirmative  action office or officer  showed a  significant 
positive effect for four of  the outcomes,  but the fact that this measure 
washed out in multivariate analyses suggests that personnel networks, 
not affirmative action networks,  were the most important interorgani- 
zational conduits of  these practices. 
Location  in  the  "institutional"  (nonprofit  and  government)  sector 
showed an effect for every outcome despite the fact that many state and 
federal agencies used  civil service systems, which incorporate our out- 
come variables,  before  1955; the at-risk group includes relatively few 
state or federal agencies. By examining the constant ( -5.704) and param- 
eters in equation (1) of  table 3 we find that nonprofits (1.17 1) were 2 1% 
more likely to adopt job descriptions than organizations in the reference 
group, city agencies (.899) were  16% more likely, and county agencies 
(1.540) were  27%  more  likely.  The nonprofit  sector shows significant, 
positive effects in three of  the equations; county governments show up 
in five; city governments show up in three; and the federal government 
shows up in one. In accord  with DiPrete's  argument that government 
agencies used bridged job ladders to achieve EEO compliance from the 
mid-1970s, we find that only county and federal governments show posi- 
tive effects on job ladders, and only the 1974-85  time period shows an 
effect. 
We do not present a table for promotion testing because only one factor 
had a significant bivariate effect. Personnel association membership pro- 
duced a log-likelihood  chi-square statistic of  4.71, with a coefficient  of 
.894 and a  standard  error of  ,387. The practice  of  promotion  testing 
showed the slowest growth over the period and was the least prevalent EEO Law 
of  all of  these practices by 1985; this supports our hypothesis that EEO 
case law discouraged employers from using tests to evaluate employees. 
We believe that, taken together, these results demonstrate that since 
1955 particular ILM practices diffused largely in response to shifts in the 
legal environment. They diffused through networks of  personnel profes- 
sionals who collectively devised organizational formulas for inoculation 
against  EEO litigation.  Organizations subject to  public  scrutiny  were 
more likely to adopt these practices. Organizations subject to direct fed- 
eral oversight in view of  their contractor status were no more likely to 
adopt these practices than were other organizations because the process 
by which the practices spread is diffuse and normative rather than spe- 
cific and coercive. 
CONCLUSION 
Organizational analysts have traditionally explained management prac- 
tices by tracing their origins. This has been our strategy as well, and the 
process  has led us to be skeptical about the very terms internal, labor, 
and market. Between the 1960s and 1980s, as in the 1930s and 1940s, 
organizations adopted formal promotion  mechanisms in response to ex- 
ternal changes as much as, or more than, in response to internal impera-
tives. They installed these mechanisms in reaction to the elaboration of 
employee rights, as well  as to deal with problems  associated with the 
management of labor (i.e., human capital). And they adopted these prac- 
tices to conform to legal requirements, as well as to effect interior market 
mechanisms.  We found that organizations  adopt ILM practices less in 
response to internal imperatives than in response to changes in the gen- 
eral model of  organizing offered by the environment. 
Our findings concern the relationship between the state and organiza- 
tions. In the United States, public policy governing organizational prac- 
tices seldom takes the form of direct mandates; policies create broad rules 
about outcomes rather than specific rules about means to those outcomes. 
As a result,  specific organizational means are worked out in the nexus 
between  organizations  and the state. Ambiguous  public policies  invite 
organizations to experiment with solutions that will withstand legal tests, 
and in turn the courts and Congress affirm  certain strategies and veto 
others (Edelman 1992). This process contributed to the evolving under- 
standing of  what constitutes discrimination and how to guard against it 
(see Burstein  1990). In the case of  EEO law, the courts discouraged the 
use of formal testing and made it clear that organizations that used volun- 
tary quotas would open themselves up to reverse-discrimination litiga- 
tion.  But  they  approved  the  formalization  of  hiring  and promotion American Journal of  Sociology 
through the use  of traditional ILM practices.  This procedural  strategy 
became the favored approach to pursuing nondiscrimination. The process 
was diffuse and normative, rather than targeted and coercive, and this 
showed up in our finding that being a federal contractor, or coming under 
EEOC or OFCCP scrutiny, had no net effect.  In short, public policy 
helped to create broad models of  organizing that were embraced as just 
and rational by all sorts of organizations; it did not force a narrow range 
of  targeted organizations to adopt specified practices in order to avoid 
sanctions. 
These findings are entirely consistent with the idea that ILM mecha- 
nisms got their first push from federal labor legislation of  the 1930s and 
1940s (Jacoby  1985) and wartime labor market controls (Baron et al. 
1986), both  of  which helped to designate ILM practices as solutions to 
problems of unionism, turnover, and motivation. Since 1964 federal EEO 
law has caused personnel managers to view formal selection and promo- 
tion practices as ways to protect employee  rights and, simultaneously, 
rationalize the allocation of workers. One result is that management came 
to see affirmative action in a positive light-as  a force for equity and 
efficiency (Haward Law Review  1989). Legal changes also encouraged 
managers to treat all employees as career oriented and self-actualizing 
by creating organizational structures that would allow all classes of  em- 
ployees  to  pursue  promotions,  including  groups  employers previously 
took to have naturally low aspirations and weak needs for ego gratifica- 
tion (e.g., minorities and women). 
It appears that legal changes have altered the meaning of ILM mecha- 
nisms since the 1960s (see Pfeffer  and Cohen  1984); as a result,  union 
attitudes have changed. Pfeffer and Cohen found strong evidence that, 
for personnel managers and unions, ILM mechanisms represent an effort 
to maximize  management  control.  But since 1964, ILM practices have 
come to represent a means to achieve equity. Personnel managers contin- 
ued to promote ILMs because it was in their interest to do so. And ILM 
mechanisms have continued to exemplify garbage-can theory's  solution- 
in-search-of-a-problem, for EEO is just the latest in a series of  problems 
personnel managers have sought to solve with ILMs (Cohen, March, and 
Olsen  1972). Yet the evidence suggests that once ILM mechanisms had 
taken on a different meaning, unions stopped opposing them. Our find- 
ings reinforce the idea that interest group goals are not primordial and 
unwavering; rather they change over time in response to shifts in the 
environment (DiMaggio 1988; Dobbin 1992). 
We  have  suggested  that  organizational  employment  practices  are 
driven  by  evolving  conceptions  of  the  individual,  and of  individual 
rights, that become institutionalized in public policy. Employment prac- 
tices, in turn, feed back into these conceptions. To wit, ILM practices EEO  Law 
that make promotion  available to  all  categories of  employees  portray 
ambition and achievement orientation as characteristics of  all individu-
als-as  inherent in individualism. These practices also democratize orga- 
nizational representations of  human motivation by  breaking down the 
distinction between managers and employees Bendix (1956) identified in 
early thought and practice; in contemporary management doctrine even 
the lowest-level employees are driven by the same desire for mobility as 
their bosses.  Of  course, management practices designed to achieve effi- 
ciency have always been oriented to current ideas about human nature, 
and in turn they have always helped to construct beliefs  about human 
nature. This was as true in the heyday of  Taylorism as it is today. We 
view the legal and organizational concern with guarding the integrity of 
workers  (e.g., sexual harassment  policies), with participative manage- 
ment and work-group identification (e.g.,  quality circles), and with trans- 
forming all jobs into rungs on career ladders to make advancement avail- 
able to all (e.g., open job  bidding and formal promotion  mechanisms) 
as integral  to  today's  organizational  representation  of  the individual. 
However, evidence that, since the mid-1980s,  firms have moved away 
from long-term employment and toward short-term contracting suggests 
that the future of  the organizational embodiments of  individualism that 
we have depicted is uncertain (Hirsch 1991; Pfeffer and Baron 1988). 
While prevailing rationalist theorists treat organizational structure as 
mainly responsive to economic imperatives that transcend time and lo- 
cale, we have shown the impact of  particular institutions found in the 
environment. Those institutions reflect and embody the expanding West- 
ern conception  of  the individual that is central to the project of  moder- 
nity. Institutional attention to the individual has intensified and has pro- 
duced new organizational  practices in recent decades; this process  has 
been  fueled by  pressures  to achieve  equity by extending  the rights of 
occupational mobility and expanded organizational membership to all of 
society's  members  (Selznick  1969).  The new  organizational  model  for 
promoting equity incorporates practices that, at the same time, advance 
the project of  rationalization by contributing to the efficient allocation of 
"human  capital."  Future studies  could  usefully  set aside  the  premise 
that organizational practices are structured by extrasocietal principles of 
efficiency and attend to how the evolving institutional  constructions of 
individualism and efficiency affect organizational practices. 
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